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Abstract
Using a nonlinear structural VAR approach, we estimate the eﬀects
of exogenous monetary policy shocks in the presence of a zero lower
bound constraint on nominal interest rates and examine the impact
of such a constraint on the eﬀectiveness of counter-cyclical monetary
policies based on the data from Japan. We ﬁnd that when interest
rates are at zero, the output eﬀect of exogenous shocks to monetary
policy is cut in half if the central bank continues to target the interest
rate. The conditional impulse response functions allow us to isolate
the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks operating through the interest
rate channel when other possible channels of monetary transmission
are present.
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According to the standard Keynesian textbook model, an expansionary mon-
etary policy leads to a decline in the real interest rate which in turn decreases
the cost of capital, thereby causes a rise in consumer and investment spend-
ing and hence, raises aggregate demand and output. Many economists seem
to agree that such an interest rate channel is the key component of how
monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the real economy [e.g. Taylor
(1995)]. However, since nominal interest rates cannot be lower than zero,
one implication of such a transmission mechanism is that a liquidity trap
would eliminate the eﬀect of monetary shocks on the real economy. Once
the nominal interest rate hits the zero value, monetary policy would become
impotent when it is mostly needed.
The possibility that such a zero bound on interest rates might interfere
with the conduct of monetary policy is not just a purely theoretical concern.
For example, the recent experience of Japan, together with low inﬂation and
a sharp decline in interest rates in many other countries in the past two
decades, have brought the potential threat of deﬂation and the zero bound
on nominal interest rates into focus. In the case of Japan, the overnight
call rate, which is the policy instrument for the Bank of Japan, has been
below 50 basis points since mid 1995, accompanied by economic stagnancy
and deﬂationary pressure (see Figure 1). Such “zero interest rates” have not
been observed in the United States and most other developed economies so
far. However, with the recent phenomenon of low inﬂation, the argument
that the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy could be severely reduced with zero
nominal interest rates no longer seems irrelevant.
These developments have given rise to a renewed interest in the impli-
cations of the zero lower bound for monetary policy. While most of the
recent studies on this issue have relied on simulations of macro econometric
models, this paper uses data on Japanese economy, which has experienced
more than 5 years of “zero interest rates,” to obtain empirical estimates of
monetary policy eﬀects when nominal interest rates hit the zero bound and
to investigate the extent to which such a constraint might aﬀect the ability
of a central bank to conduct its policy. These empirical results would be
useful in evaluating diﬀerent policy options for the Japanese economy and
allow us to draw lessons for other countries regarding the impact of the zero
bound on monetary policy.
1Estimating the eﬀects of monetary policy under the non-negativity con-
straints can also help us evaluate empirically the relative importance of
diﬀerent monetary transmission mechanisms. Many monetarist economists
[e.g. Meltzer (1995)] have emphasized the importance of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism operating through other asset prices. They argue that
market interest rates are only one of the relative prices aﬀected by monetary
shocks. A monetary shock that alters the nominal and real stocks of money
aﬀects actual and anticipated prices of a variety of domestic and foreign
assets, which in turn may aﬀect investment and consumer spending through
Tobin’s q theory of investment and the wealth eﬀect on consumption.
Some economists also view frictions in the credit markets due to asym-
metric information as playing an important role in the process of monetary
transmission [e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995)]. They argue that either
through the balance sheet channel or the bank lending channel, a change in
monetary policy can have an additional (and signiﬁcant) impact on invest-
ment and consumer spending, and hence aﬀects the aggregate demand and
output.
The responses of the economy to monetary shocks most likely reﬂect the
joint eﬀect of diﬀerent monetary transmission mechanisms, whose individual
impact may be diﬃcult to identify empirically. Nevertheless, observing zero
interest rates provides an excellent opportunity to isolate the impact of
monetary policy operating through the channels other than interest rates.
Comparison of the responses of the economy to a monetary shock when the
interest rate is at zero and when it is strictly positive would make possible
an assessment of the importance of the interest rate channel.
Our study contributes to the recent literature on the zero bound on
nominal interest rates. Using structural models of the U.S. economy, several
authors perform numerical simulations to ﬁnd the extent to which the zero
bound prevents real rates from falling and hence aﬀects the central bank’s
ability to optimally respond to adverse macroeconomic shocks. Fuhrer and
Madigan (1997), Orphanides and Wieland (1998), and Reifschneider and
Williams (2000) all ﬁnd that monetary policy is signiﬁcantly constrained by
the zero bound under a policy regime with a low inﬂation target. Similar
studies based on diﬀerent models are conducted by Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1997) and Wolman (1998) with diﬀerent conclusions about the im-
portance of the zero bound as a constraint on monetary policy. The main
objective of these studies is the normative implications for monetary policy
2of the zero bound. They try to evaluate “whether the zero bound intro-
duce distortions that make low inﬂation undesirable”. Most of the studies
in this literature except Reifschneider and Williams (2000) have focused on
the interest rate channel of monetary transmission.
In contrast, our study is based on direct empirical evidence on macroeco-
nomic performance in a “zero interest rates” environment. Using the struc-
tural VAR approach, we examine to what extent the zero bound may aﬀect a
central bank’s policy eﬀectiveness when allowing for other channels of mon-
etary transmission. Moreover, through state dependent impulse-response
functions, we evaluate the relative importance of diﬀerent monetary trans-
mission channels. The paper also has a technical contribution to the struc-
tural VAR literature. It introduces a type of nonlinearity into a standard
VAR model by incorporating a censored left hand variable.
Another strand of the zero interest rate literature focuses on the theo-
retical issue of how to avoid the zero bound and a liquidity trap and how to
escape from them if trapped, usually with speciﬁc references to Japan. While
many agree on how to avoid them, a variety of ways to get out of a liquidity
trap are proposed, emphasizing diﬀerent channels of monetary transmission
[e.g Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999), Christiano (1999), Krugman (1998),
McCallum (2000a) and Svensson (2000) among others].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
used in this study. Section 3 discusses our econometric strategy. Section 4
presents the main results and section 5 concludes.
2T h e D a t a
Since the collapse of the speculative asset price bubble in early 1990, Japan
has suﬀered prolonged deﬂation and economic stagnancy. Figure 1 exhibits
industrial production and overall wholesale price together with the inter-
bank call rates in Japan during 1990s. It can be seen clearly that output has
failed to grow during the past decade while price level has been continuously
declining (see Figure 1, both output and price are measured on the left
scale). Such economic distress has prompted the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to
adopt an expansionary monetary policy by lowering nominal interest rates.
By September 1995, the inter-bank call rate, which has been the policy
instrument for the BoJ, was pushed down to below 50 basis points and
remained at that low level until the end of 2001 (Figure 1, measured on the
3right scale). The experience of Japanese monetary policy during this period
therefore provides a good opportunity to study the impact on monetary
policy of the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates.
In this paper, we use a monthly data set from 1991 to 2001. The variables
include the Japanese wholesale price index, an index of industrial produc-
tion, the inter-bank overnight call rate, the aggregate money supply (M1)
and the Nikkei stock market index. Data on the price level, the interest rate
and the stock market price are obtained from the BoJ. Data on industrial
production and M1 are obtained from International Financial Statistics of
the IMF. A reason for our focus on the time period between 1991 and 2001
is to avoid major policy changes within the sample. There appear to be
several structural changes in Japanese monetary policy during the past 30
years. For example, in the second half of 1980s, stabilizing the exchange
rate seemed to be the main policy goal for the BoJ due to the Plaza Accord.
Moreover, the dramatic rise in asset prices starting in late 1980s caused the
BoJ to refocus its policy activities on asset prices. See Hertzel (1999) for a
discussion of Japanese monetary policy since 1970s. After the burst of the
asset price bubble in 1990, however, the main concern of the BoJ is to deal
with deﬂation and to revive its domestic economic activity, and there does
not seem to be any major structural change in its policy.
3 The Model
3.1 VAR with a censored variable
To examine the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks on the economy when the
n o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t ei sa tz e r o ,w ep r opose a nonlinear Vector Autoregres-
sion (VAR) model that incorporates a censored variable. The model allows
us to estimate the impulse-response functions conditional on the level of the
interest rate.
Before introducing our model in detail, we brieﬂy describe the monetary
policy practice of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) during the 1990s, a period when
the BoJ explicitly uses a short-term nominal interest rate (the overnight
inter-bank call rate) as the policy instrument. In the late 1990s, the BoJ
adopted what they call “zero interest rate policy.”1 The goal of this policy
is to avoid further intensifying deﬂationary pressures and stop the economic
1According to the BoJ, the zero interest rate policy covers the period from February
4downturn. The BoJ’s ﬁrm commitment to the zero interest rate policy is
reﬂected in the well-cited statement of the BoJ’s oﬃcial: “We (the BoJ) will
continue the zero interest rate policy until we reach a situation where de-
ﬂationary concerns are dispelled” (Governor Hayami’s statement at a press
conference on April 13, 1999). In short, the policy undertaken by the BoJ
in the late 1990s is to move nominal interest rates down to a level as low as
possible by satiating the money market with excess supply of funds. One
important aspect of the zero interest rate policy is that an exogenous mone-
tary easing will not result in any further movement in the interest rate when
the rate is already on the zero lower bound. Therefore, while the stance of
monetary policy can be directly measured by the interest rate when it is
positive, the interest rate at zero is no longer an adequate indicator of the
policy stance.
To model the behavior of the monetary authority in Japan described
above, we propose the following speciﬁcation. Let Rt be a nominal short-
term interest rate and R∗
t be a latent variable measuring the stance of mon-
etary policy.2 R∗
t is in general not observable. However, under the monetary
policy regime that uses the short-term interest rate as the operating target,
R∗








where c is a lower bound on the nominal interest rate at which Rt is regarded
as essentially zero. We will further discuss what value is the most appro-
priate for c below. Equation (1) treats Rt as a censored variable. It implies
that, when used by the monetary authority as the policy instrument, the
short-term interest rate provides a direct measure of the stance of monetary
policy. However, if the monetary policy drives the interest rate down to
zero, a further monetary easing will not aﬀect the interest rate. Our focus
is to identify exogenous monetary policy shocks to R∗
t and estimate their
1999 to August 2000 when the call rate was pushed down to 2 - 3 basis points. In this
study, we treat the whole period since late 1995 as the zero interest rate regime, during
which the interest rate remains below 50 basis points. See below for further discussions.
2This paper is also related to an early paper by Avery (1979), who uses a latent vari-
able to model monetary policy. The major diﬀerence is that Avery (1979) is mainly con-
cerned with the endogenous determination of monetary policy by relating a set of “causal”
macroeconomic variables to changes in money market “indicator” variables through a sin-
gle dimension latent variable, while our focus is on identifying and estimating the eﬀects
of exogenous innovations to monetary policy.
5dynamic eﬀects on key macroeconomic aggregates.3
To connect the above scheme to the macroeconomic shocks, consider a
standard money market model as illustrated in Figure 2. When the interest
rate is the operating target, we can describe the determination of the interest
rate and money growth in terms of fundamental macroeconomic shocks by











where ∆mt is the growth rate of money at time t. Note that the short-term
interest rate Rt is determined jointly by (1) and (2).
Equation (2) represents the monetary policy reaction function (or policy
rule), where εY
t is a vector of innovations to the macroeconomic variables
to which the central bank responds contemporaneously when setting the
short-term interest rate. εs
t is an exogenous monetary policy shock due to
any discretionary actions that are not captured by the systematic monetary
policy rule, and εd
t in equation (3) stands for an exogenous money demand
shock. When the interest rate is the policy instrument, the monetary au-
thority fully accommodates money demand shocks so that εd
t only aﬀects
money growth without having any immediate eﬀect on the interest rate. On
the other hand, the exogenous monetary policy shock εs
t aﬀects both the
interest rate and money growth.
More speciﬁcally, equations (1) - (3) together imply that, when the in-
terest rate is positive, an expansionary policy shock (εs
t < 0) decreases the
interest rate and at the same time pushes up money growth. When the
interest rate is initially on the zero bound, however, an expansionary policy
shock (εs
t < 0) does not generate any movement in the interest rate, but
leads to an increase in money growth. In other words, when the interest
rate is positive, both the interest rate and money growth contain informa-
tion about monetary policy actions in either direction. But under the zero
interest rate regime, exogenous monetary expansions can only be reﬂected
in the corresponding movements of money growth, while the interest rate
remains on its lower bound.
The maintained assumption is that there is no structural change in the
3R
∗
t c a na l s ob et h o u g h to fa st h ei n t e r e s tr a t el e v e lt h em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t yw o u l d
set according to its policy rule if there were no lower bound on the interest rate, or the
intended interest rate.
6policy rule during the whole sample period. We believe this is a reason-
able assumption about the monetary policy behavior of the BoJ during the
1990s because there is no indication that the central bank has adopted an
alternative operating procedure in its conduct of monetary policy after the
interest rate had reached zero, despite that many economists have suggested
that the monetary authority should take some quantitative measures in the
presence of the zero interest rate. This allows us to address the central issue
of how the monetary policy eﬀects are altered when the interest rate reaches
its lower bound but the central bank continues to follow the same policy
rule. In a later section, we consider the alternative scenario in which the
BoJ switches to target to money growth under the zero interest rate regime.
We now turn to the issue of what value is the most appropriate for c.I n
general, the call rate cannot become exactly zero because of the existence of
various transaction costs.4 Those costs add up to 2-3 basis points. But the
choice of the value for c should be made to best describe the BoJ’s policy
rule. The BoJ has set the uncollateralized overnight call rate guideline at
0.50% for 1995-1998 and at 0.25% after September 1998. Between February
1999 and July 2000, this lower bound was further pushed down to about
0.02-0.03%. It therefore appears to be a good approximation to the actual
policy behavior to model the rate as being censored or equivalently R∗
t ≤ Rt
as long as the actual rate Rt is less than 50 basis points. A glance at the plot
of the actual rates in Figure 1 appears to suggest that a regime change had
occurred in 1995 when the nominal rate hit 50 basis points. Moreover, it is
also supported by Krugman (1997), which argues that at a nominal rate of
0.43% “the economy is clearly in a very good approximation to liquidity trap
conditions.” Accordingly, throughout this paper, we use the terms such as
‘zero interest rate’ or ‘zero bound’ even when the actual lower bound is not
necessarily exactly equal to zero.5
The small VAR system we estimate consists of three groups of variables.
The ﬁrst group includes standard macroeconomic variables such as output
and price. Monetary policy is assumed to respond to these variables con-
temporaneously. The second group are money market variables including a
short-term nominal interest rate (the overnight inter-bank call rate is used in
4Okina and Oda (2000) discusses the details of various transaction costs for the
overnight inter-bank borrowings in Japan.
5There is also a technical concern for the choice of the lower bound c. Throughout the
sample covering the period of 1990 - 2001, there are only a few observations with the call
rate being around 2 or 3 basis points. Hence it is impossible to get sensible estimates of
policy impact in such a circumstance.
7this paper) and the growth rate of aggregate money. These variables contain
information about the stance of monetary policy. The last group includes
some broad ﬁnancial market variables such as stock market indices. These
are the variables that can potentially play important roles in the monetary
transmission process as suggested by Meltzer (1995), particularly when the
nominal interest rate is on the zero bound. However, monetary policy is
assumed not to respond to these variables contemporaneously.
Denote three groups of variables mentioned above by Yt,W∗
t,Xt respec-
tively, where Yt is a k × 1 vector, W∗
t is an l × 1 vector and Xt is an n × 1















 + µ + ut (4)
where W∗
t =( R∗
t,∆mt)0, Wt =( Rt,∆mt)0, B(L)=B1L−···− BpLp with
L being the lag operator, and µ is a vector of constants. The ut stands for a
vector of one-step-ahead forecast errors and we assume that ut ∼ N(0,Σ)
where Σ is a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix. It is important to note
that in equation (4), W∗
t on the left hand side of the equation includes the
latent variable R∗
t,w h i l eWt on the right hand side of the equation includes
the actual interest rate Rt, which is related to R∗
t in a nonlinear way. This
speciﬁc feature yields a model that exhibits interesting dynamics.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
The structural form of the system (4) can be written as
A0Z∗



















t is the exogenous monetary policy shock and εd
t is the exogenous
money demand shock. We assume that εt ∼ N(0,Im).
We impose the following block recursive restrictions to identify the model.
First, we assume that the exogenous money market shock εM
t and the other
ﬁnancial market shock εX
t do not aﬀect output and price level (Yt)i nt h e
8same period, which is a quite standard identiﬁcation restriction in the liter-
ature [e.g. Christiano et al (1999)] especially when monthly data are used.
Second, we assume that the policy maker does not respond contemporane-
ously to the ﬁnancial variable Xt when setting the interest rate, where Xt
includes an aggregate stock price index in our estimation. We believe that
this is a reasonable assumption for the following reason. Since the burst of
the asset price bubble in 1990, the focus of Japanese monetary policy has
shifted to ﬁghting deﬂation and the economic slump. Even if the monetary
authority does not completely ignore asset prices when setting its policy
instrument, it no longer appears to be the systematic policy for the BoJ to
respond to stock prices or some other ﬁnancial variables contemporaneously
after 1991.
These two assumptions together with the restrictions implied by the
policy scheme of interest rate targeting (i.e. R∗
t does not respond to the
money demand shock εd
t) imply that the matrix A0 is block triangular.
Rewrite (5) as
Z∗
t = B(L)Zt + µ + C0εt (6)
where C0 is the matrix of the impact multipliers. Since C0 = A−1
0 ,t h e









which relates the fundamental shocks εt to the VAR residual ut.
Note that in the above matrix, C22 is an l × l lower triangular matrix,
which imposes suﬃcient identifying restrictions to investigate the dynamic
response of Zt to a monetary policy shock εs
t [see also Keating (1996)].
The system (6) subject to (1) and (7) can be estimated by the maximum
likelihood method with additional necessary zero restrictions on C11 and
C33. The Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is used to choose the number
of lags in (6). The derivation of the likelihood function is provided in the
Appendix.
When the economy is in liquidity trap, money demand is likely to be-
have quite diﬀerently than in the normal environment with positive interest
6Note that since we are not interested in identifying the money demand shock ε
d
t,i t
is just a simpliﬁcation to assume that the money growth ∆mt does not respond to the
ﬁnancial market shock ε
X
t i nt h es a m ep e r i o d .
9rates. We therefore allow for the possibility that when the nominal interest
rate is zero, money growth ∆mt responds diﬀerently to εY
t as well as εM
t .
Accordingly, the elements in the second row of matrices C21 and C22 have
diﬀerent values when the interest rate is at zero (the estimated coeﬃcients
on the zero-interest-rate dummies are reported in Table 2 below). We also
allow for diﬀerent intercept term for ∆mt in model (6) when the zero bound
is approached.7
Unlike in the linear case, the impulse response function (IRF) of the
above VAR system is history- and shock-dependent [Potter (2000), Koop,
Pesaran, and Potter (1996)]. This feature of the model allows us to investi-
gate the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock under two interest rate regimes,
an issue we will discuss in more detail in the following sections.
4R e s u l t s
We estimate the nonlinear structural VAR model with the monthly data on
Japanese wholesale price index, industrial output, the inter-bank call rate,
the annual growth rate of money and the Nikkei stock price index (denoted
by Z =( p,y,R,∆m,x)) from 1991 to 2001.8 Since our primary interest
is in the dynamic responses of the variables, we do not report the point
estimates of the VAR parameters here but only mention some features of
the estimated model. First, Table 1 shows that the signs of the estimates
of the elements in C21 and C22 are consistent with the counter-cyclical
monetary policy pursued by the BoJ during that period. Namely, the BoJ
takes expansionary policy actions by cutting the interest rate when facing
ad e ﬂationary shock or a negative shock to output. (Notice the large and
signiﬁcant policy response to a positive shock to the price level (C21(1,1))
in the table below.)




7We also let the ﬁnancial variable Xt respond diﬀerently to exogenous shocks under
the zero interest rate regime. But we ﬁnd the diﬀerence is small and insigniﬁcant.
8T h e4 - v a r i a b l eV A Re x c l u d i n gt h es t o c km a r k e tp r i c e ,t h a ti sZ =( p,y,R,∆M), is
a l s oe s t i m a t e d .T h er e s u l t sa r ev e r ys i m i l a rt ot h o s ef r o mt h e5 - v a r i a b l eV A R .
10(Note: C21 is 2 × 2m a t r i x . C21(1,1) measures the response of R∗
t to a positive
shock to the price level and C21(1,2) measures the response of R∗
t to a positive
shock to output. C22 is a 2 × 2 lower triangular matrix. C22(1,1) measures the
standard deviation of monetary policy shocks. The numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors.)
Second, nonlinearity is an important feature of the data because of the
censorship and the diﬀerent behavior of money demand when the interest
rate is at zero. Figure 3 displays the ﬁtted value of R∗
t b a s e do no u rV A Re s -
timates together with the actually observed call rate. We can see that there
are still large ﬂuctuations in R∗
t in the zero interest rate regime, indicating
active policy movements during that period even when the actual interest
rate rarely moves. The ﬁgure also shows that the estimates of the policy
stance R∗
t track the lower bound on the interest rate closely after 1995, con-
sistent with the zero interest rate policy stated by the monetary authority.
It is interesting to notice the sharp decreases in R∗
t near the end of the
sample period, implying that there were large monetary expansions in the
second half of 2001. The BoJ has been criticized for conducting too tight
monetary policy particularly after the interest rate had reached the zero
bound. This signiﬁcant easing of its policy suggests that the BoJ may have
ﬁnally abandoned the zero interest rate policy and adopt a more expansion-
ary monetary stance. Our estimates also conﬁrm that there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the behavior of money growth during the zero interest rate
period. Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients on the zero-interest-rate
dummies (q1 through q4 )t h a tc a p t u r et h ed i ﬀerences in response of ∆mt
to the macroeconomic shock εY
t and money market shock εM
t
Table 2: Zero Interest Rate Dummies
q1 q2 q3 q4
-.0052 -.0147 .0060 -.0386
(.0043) (.0051) (.0312) (.0186)
(Notes: The parameters q1 and q2 measure the additional impacts of a macro shock
εY
t on money growth ∆mt when the interest rate is at zero. The parameters q3 and
q4 measure the additional impacts of a money market shock εM
t on money growth
∆mt when the interest rate is at zero. The numbers in parentheses are the standard
errors.)
Based on the estimated VAR model, we now examine the dynamic re-
sponses of output, price, and other variables to an expansionary monetary
11policy shock when the interest rate is at zero and when it is positive. Our in-
terest centers around the following two questions: (i) How much of the eﬀect
of an expansionary monetary policy shock on output is actually eliminated
by the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates? (ii) How impor-
tant is the interest rate channel compared with other channels of monetary
transmission?
The impulse response function (IRF) is often obtained by the diﬀer-
ence of the h-steps-ahead forecast of the series with a current shock of a
unit size from the same forecast without a shock. In a linear time series,
this diﬀerence reduces to the h-th order parameters in its moving-average
(MA) representation. In a vector auto-regression with a censored left hand
variable, however, the MA representation is no longer linear in the shocks.
As a result, the IRF for the nonlinear model is dependent upon the entire
history of the series as well as the size and direction of the shock. This
state-dependent feature of the IRF allows us to analyze the policy eﬀects
conditional on the current state of the system.
We follow the literature on nonlinear impulse response [Koop et al (1996),
Gallant et al (1993), and Potter (2000)] and treat a nonlinear IRF as the
diﬀerence between a pair of conditional expectations of the variables given
an o n - z e r os h o c ka n daz e r os h o c ka tt h ec u r r e n tp e r i o d ,i . e .
E(Zt+h|Ωt−1,εt)−E(Zt+h|Ωt−1)
where Ωt−1 stands for the information set at t − 1, and h =1 ,2,···is the
time horizon. In other words, to calculate the nonlinear IRF, we have to
specify the nature of the shock (its size and sign) and the initial condition,
Ωt−1. To calculate the conditional expectations, we simulate the model in
the following manner. First, we randomly draw εt+j from N(0,Im)f o rj =
1,2,···,hand then simulate the model conditional on an initial condition
Ωt−1 and a particular shock εt. This process is repeated 500 times and the
estimated conditional expectation is obtained as the average of the outcomes.
4.1 The eﬀects of monetary policy shocks when the interest
rate is zero
Figures 4(a) - 4(e) report the estimated impulse reponse functions (IRFs) of
the variables included in our model. The solid and broken lines stand for,
respectively, the IRFs of the variables to an expansionary monetary policy
shock of size equal to one standard deviation when the interest rate is at zero
12and when it is positive. The horizontal axis measures the number of months
after the shock. The IRF under each regime is calculated as an average of
all the IRFs corresponding to the historical dates belonging to each of the
two regimes: the regime where the call rate is at zero and the regime where
it is positive. We ﬁn das t r i k i n gd i ﬀerence in the IRFs under two regimes,
which are consistent with the standard textbook explanation of the interest
rate channel of monetary transmission.
When the interest rate is positive, we obtain the IRFs commonly ob-
served in the standard monetary VAR literature. An expansionary policy
shock decreases the nominal interest rate (Figure 4(c)), increases money
growth (Figure 4(d)) and the aggregate price level (Figure 4(a)). The de-
crease in the nominal interest rate and the rising price level imply a much
lower real interest rate which then leads to increases in real output (Figure
4(b)). The full impact on output reaches its peak in about 10 months after
the initial monetary expansion. Moreover, the IRF of the aggregate price
level exhibits the usual “price puzzle”, where the price level initially declines
under an expansionary monetary shock.
The same monetary policy shock, however, generates quite diﬀerent dy-
namic responses of the macroeconomic variables when the interest rate is at
the zero bound. While money growth and the price level continue to rise
in response to the expansionary policy shock (Figure 4(d) and 4(a)), the
nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero bound and can no longer
fall (Figure 4(c)). As a result, although the rising price level still generate a
lower real interest rate, the decrease in the real rate is only moderate, lead-
ing to much smaller increase in output. In fact, our estimates suggest that
the peak impact of the monetary policy shock on output when the nominal
interest rate is at zero is only about half the size of what the monetary policy
can achieve when the rate is positive (Figure 4(b)). It is interesting to note
that the IRF of the price level does not show the usual “price puzzle” under
the zero interest rate regime.
The diﬀerence in the dynamic responses of output under two regimes
provides an empirical estimate of the extent to which the zero bound con-
straint on interest rates impedes the transmission of monetary innovations.
It suggests that the monetary authority cannot achieve the full eﬀect of pol-
icy actions by continuing to target the nominal interest rate when the rate is
stuck at zero. It also suggests that if the central bank generates high enough
inﬂation, probably through some quantitative measures, so that the real in-
terest rate decreases as much as in the normal circumstance, then it may
13be possible to overcome this zero interest rate constraint. We address this
issue in a later section by exploring alternative monetary policy strategies.
Some economists such as Meltzer (1995) have argued that a monetary
innovation not only changes a short-term interest rate, but also alters the
relative prices of a variety of assets. To capture this eﬀect of the policy
shocks, we include an aggregate stock market price index in our VAR system.
Figure 5 shows the stock price index indeed rises following an expansionary
monetary shock, even when the nominal interest rate remains at zero. Such
an increase in asset prices can have positive inﬂuence on real output either
through the wealth eﬀect on consumption or through a mechanism involving
Tobin’s q theory of investment. It can also magnify the interest rate channel
impact through a credit channel eﬀect [Bernanke and Gertler (1995)]. When
the interest rate is always positive, it is diﬃcult to separate empirically the
eﬀect of monetary policy shocks operating through the standard interest
rate channel from those through any other channels. When the interest
rate sometimes hits the zero bound, however, we can construct a pair of
IRFs under two regimes and take the diﬀerence as a measure of the relative
importance of the interest rate channel. More speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence of
the responses of output provides a lower bound of the contribution of the
interest rate channel because the real interest rate is still decreasing due
to the rising price level even when the nominal rate is at zero. The large
diﬀerence of the IRFs in Figure 4(b) appears to conﬁrm that the interest
rate channel is by far the most important monetary transmission.
4.2 The impact of the zero interest constraint on counter
cyclical monetary policy
Some recent studies investigate the eﬀect of the zero bound constraint on
the ability of monetary authority to conduct eﬀective policy [e.g Fuhrer and
Madigan (1996), Orphanides and Wieland (1998) among others]. They use
numerical simulation to ﬁnd the extent to which a zero bound prevents the
monetary authority from pursuing a counter cyclical interest-rate policy in
response to negative macroeconomic shocks. We perform an analogous ex-
ercise by subjecting our VAR model to some adverse macroeconomic shocks
to see how diﬀerently the system would respond depending on whether or
not the interest rate is on the zero bound.
To conduct this exercise, we choose a macroeconomic shock (any mixture
of inﬂation, output, and monetary shocks) that would generate an output
14decline for two consecutive quarters—the standard deﬁnition of a recession—in
the normal situation. We then subject our VAR model to the same shock
conditional on the interest rate being zero. Figures 6 and 7 display the
IRFs of the interest rate and output, respectively. In the normal situation
where the interest rate is not constrained, such a negative shock drives
down output as well as the interest rate as the monetary authority pursues
a counter cyclical policy. The resulting lower interest rate would eventually
push the economy out of the recession. In contrast, if the interest rate is at
zero when the adverse macroeconomic shock hits the economy, the monetary
policy would lose much of its leverage against such a negative shock. Figures
6 and 7 show that the interest rate cannot fall any further, while the recovery
is not only slower, but also weaker. If the interest rate is above zero when
the negative shock hits the economy, the output will fully recover in about
14 months and then continues to rise about its original level. But if the
interest rate is at zero when the shock hits the economy, it would take more
than 20 months for output to barely come back to its original level.
An alternative way to look at the impact of the zero bound constraint
is to postulate a hypothetical situation in which the zero bound constraint
is entirely removed. How diﬀerently would the economy evolve after 2001
with stochastic macroeconomic shocks with and without the zero bound
constraint? We simulate the estimated VAR starting from the last sample
period, and compare the dynamics of output and the interest rate. Figures
8 and 9 display the results from such an exercise. We can see that without
zero bound constraint, the interest rate would become signiﬁcantly negative,
which in turn stimulates the economy and output rises faster and reaches a
level much higher than it would be with the constraint. One major caveat
of such a comparison is obviously that the model parameters are estimated
while imposing the zero bound constraint. Nevertheless, the large discrep-
ancy between the two output series in Figure 9 suggests that the zero bound
has a signiﬁcant impact on the macro economic performance of the economy.
4.3 Targeting money growth when the interest rate is at zero
The BoJ has been criticized for not being aggressive enough to combat
persistent deﬂation and prolonged economic stagnancy. Many critics argue
that eﬀective monetary policy requires quantitative easing when the interest
rate is stuck at zero. The sharp decline of our latent policy variable R∗
t near
the end of our sample period (Figure 3) suggests that the BoJ might have
15indeed started to take alternative policy actions under increasing pressures.
In this section we estimate the eﬀect of such quantitative measures when
the interest rate is at the zero bound.
Speciﬁcally, if the BoJ decided to target money growth after the interest
rate was pushed down to zero, equation (2) and (3) would be replaced by
(abstracting from all the lagged variables)
R∗
t = ˜ β0
1εY
t + ˜ β2εs




t − ˜ α2εs
t (9)
where εs
t is the exogenous policy shock, and εd
t is the exogenous money de-
mand shock, εY
t the vector of innovations to the macroeconomic variables
to which the monetary policy respond contemporaneously. Under this pol-
icy scheme, the monetary authority does not accommodate the exogenous
money demand shocks. Therefore, even when the interest rate is initially
at zero, a positive money demand shock εd
t could push R∗
t above zero, re-
sulting in an increase in the observed interest rate Rt. On the other hand,
a negative money demand shock εd
t pushes R∗
t down. If the interest rate is
already at the zero bound, such a shock does not generate any movement
in Rt. Equation (9) implies that ∆mt is only aﬀected contemporaneously
by the exogenous monetary policy shock εs
t (in addition to εY
t ), as in the
standard case of money targeting. Note that we allow the coeﬃcients on εY
t
and εs
t to take on diﬀerent values when the interest rate is at zero (equation
(8) and (9)) from those when the interest rate is positive (equation (2) and
(3)).
Unfortunately, the VAR model incorporating the above structure is ob-
servationally equivalent to the VAR model discussed in section 3. There-
fore, it is simply not possible to test whether such quantitative measures are
part of the current policy mix by comparing (8) and (9) with (2) and (3).
However, it is still possible to use the above speciﬁcation to investigate the
eﬀects of exogenous monetary policy shocks assuming the BoJ had switched
its policy instrument to quantitative measures when the interest rate is on
the zero bound. In particular, we estimate a VAR model similar to (6) and
(7), assuming that the monetary authority targets the interest rate (as in
(2) and (3)) when Rt > 0 but switches to target money growth (as in (8)
and (9)) when Rt =0 .
Figure 10 displays the reactions of the aggregate price level, real output,
the interest rate and money growth to an exogenous expansionary policy
shock under both positive and zero interest rate regimes. It shows that if
16monetary authority switches its operating target to money growth when the
interest rate is at zero, the eﬀect of a monetary shock on output would be
almost as strong as when the interest rate is positive. In contrast, the zero
bound can eliminate almost 50% of the output eﬀect of policy shocks if the
monetary authority continues to target the interest rate as found in Figure
4.
Examining Figures 4 and 10 helps ﬁnd the possible source of this large
diﬀerence. If the monetary authority switches its target to money growth
when the interest rate is at zero, an exogenous monetary expansion would
generate a price increase so large (Figure 10(a)) that even though the nomi-
nal rate is stuck at zero (Figure 10(c)), there would be enough decline in the
real interest rate to push up the level of output (Figure 10(b)). However, if
the monetary authority continues to target the interest rate, the impact of
the monetary expansion on the price level is not large enough (Figure 4(a))
to oﬀset the negative impact of the zero interest rate (Figure 4(c)). As a
result, monetary policy becomes much less eﬀective (Figure 4(b)).
Since we cannot test which scheme is a better description of the true
monetary behavior under the zero interest rate regime, the above estimates
are subject to the caveat of “identiﬁcation errors”. The BoJ has repeatedly
made it public that it is pursuing an interest rate targeting policy through
out the sample period. To the extent this is true, the results reported in
Figure 4 give us the empirical estimates of the eﬀect of the zero bound on
the interest rate channel of monetary transmission. If the true policy is
a mixture of both interest rate and money targeting, our results reported
in Figure 10 would provide direct empirical evidence favoring quantitative
measures as a way to conduct eﬀective monetary policy when the interest
rate is on the zero lower bound.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we estimate the eﬀect of an exogenous monetary shock when
nominal interest rates are at zero and examine the impacts of the zero bound
constraint on the eﬀectiveness of counter-cyclical monetary policy. While
there are many recent studies trying to evaluate the extent to which the
zero bound interferes with the conduct of monetary policy by simulating
structural models of the U.S. economy, those quantitative results are in-
evitably model speciﬁc and often lack direct empirical support. The low
17interest rates and the apparent presence of the liquidity trap in Japan dur-
ing the past decade make it possible to address such issues empirically using
a nonlinear structural VAR.
We ﬁnd that when the the interest rate is on the zero bound, up to
50% of the impact of an exogenous monetary innovation on output can be
eliminated if the monetary authority continues to target the interest rate.
The conditional IRFs allow us to isolate the impact of monetary shocks
operating through the interest rate channel when other possible channels of
monetary transmission are present. We ﬁnd that (i) an exogenous monetary
shock may still have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the real economy when nominal
interest rates are at zero, (ii) it is the interest rate channel that appears
to be the most important mechanism of monetary transmission. Moreover,
we also ﬁnd that the presence of the zero bound on nominal interest rates
could severely limit the ability of central banks to pursue a counter-cyclical
interest rate policy when facing adverse macroeconomic shocks.
It is often debated whether or not the BoJ should conduct a further
monetary easing given the stagnant domestic economy and the zero bound
constraint on its policy instrument. This paper provides some empirical ev-
idence supporting the view that the monetary authority can rely on quan-
titative measures to conduct an eﬀective monetary policy when the interest
rate is on the zero bound.
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Derivation of the likelihood function:










so that J0J = Im. Rewrite (1) as
JB(L)J0JZ∗
t = Jµ + JC0J0Jεt
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the log likelihood function takes the form as
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where T1 stands for the number of observations for which Rt >c .
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